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Abstract - The advance development in technology have made internet and online application and network usage become one 
of the important element in human life. With the high demand from the corporate and enterprise, more and more security 
appliances were developed and deployed, such as IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems), IPS (Intrusion Prevention Systems), 
Firewall, and SIEM (Security Information and Event Management).  All these security tools have serve same purpose which 
is to safe guard the whole enterprise network. However, every single tool has different ways of detection and accuracy of the 
detection. This was due to each solution deploy was highly depended with the algorithms reside in the program loaded in the 
security tools.      
These algorithms and methods provide fast and high rate of detection. However, it also produces high false alarm rate (low 
accuracy) and unable to handle high volume of data. This have attracted researchers to find algorithms and methods that can 
detect intrusions in a short period of time within a huge volume of data with high accuracy. The objective of this paper is to 
study and make a comparison among the available intrusion detections algorithms and methods in the intrusion detections. 
Focus will be given to research that have produced new intrusion detection algorithms, framework and model as well as their 
gaps in the research. Their research results and gaps can lead to any possible future research to identify new intrusion detection 
methods.   
  
Keywords – IDS, IPS, SIEM, Intrusion Detection  
  
1. INTRODUCTION  
  
The usage and important of internet has increase significantly in today world. This has led to the increase of demand for the 
security solution from the enterprise and corporate to safe guard their data and work environment from threats. All the 
connected computer networks devices regardless inside or outside the enterprise or countries require to speed up all the files, 
images, video, audio transfer between all individual.  This made the “Data” become one of the most elements important in the 
human life. Therefore, it is extremely important to find an effective way to protect this valuable network infrastructure from 
any unauthorized or malicious actions. In order to find way to provide the security for the information stored in the computer 
devices today, there are many tools available in the market for detecting attacks. Such as Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), 
Intrusion Detections System (IDS) and the more comprehensive solution of Security Incident Event Management (SIEM) tool 
are useful tool for detecting attacks.  
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One of the network security/threat prevention technology that examines network traffic flows to detect and prevent vulnerability 
exploits is known as Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). Attackers are usually exploits vulnerabilities that exist in system and 
gain control of the application or machine to perform authorizes activities such as transferring of enterprise confidential 
information or perform damage to the company systems by upload malicious software. Following a successful exploit, the 
attacker can disable the target application or can potentially access to all the rights and permissions available to the 
compromised application.   
Beside this, to monitor network environment or systems for malicious activity or policy violations, device such as intrusion 
detection system (IDS) will be use to perform this task.  Suspicious activities detected or violation is typically reported either 
to an administrator by using preconfigure alert or collected centrally using a security information and event management 
(SIEM) system. A SIEM system is a system that delivery result by combining outputs from multiple sources, and uses alarm 
filtering techniques to distinguish malicious activity from false alarms.   
  
An intrusion detection system (IDS) are usually used to inspect all inbound and outbound network activity and identifies 
suspicious patterns that may indicate a network or system attack from someone attempting to break into or compromise a 
system [20]. There are several ways to categorize an IDS:  
  
• Misuse detection vs. anomaly detection: In misused detection, IDS used technique to analyzes the information it gathers 
and compares it to large databases of attack signatures that is available. To be accurate, mean the IDS looks for a specific 
attacked that has already been known and documented. It is more like a virus detection system, misuse detection 
software is only as good as when the database of attack signatures that it uses to compare packets against are up to date 
and complete. Whereas, in anomaly detection, system administrator will have to defines the baseline of the normal state 
of the networks traffic load, breakdown, protocol, and typical packet size in the system. Then, the anomaly detector 
monitors network segments to compare their state to the normal baseline and look for anomalies.  
• Network-based vs. host-based systems: For a network-based system, or NIDS, individual packets that are flowing 
through a network are analyzed. So, NIDS can detect malicious packets that are designed to be overlooked by a firewalls 
that only using filtering rules. For a host-based system, it is mainly used to examine all the activities on each individual 
computer or host.  
• Passive system vs. reactive system: For a passive system, the IDS will signal an alert when it detects a potential security 
breach and logs the information. In a reactive system, the IDS will respond by logging off the suspected malicious 
source or by sending new rules to the firewall to block network traffic if suspicious activities were detected.  
   
Firewall and IDS are both related to network security, standard firewall only limits the access between networks to prevent 
intrusion and does not signal any attack from inside or outside the network. Whereas, IDS is differing from a firewall in that a 
firewall looks out for intrusions in order to stop them from happening but IDS evaluates a suspected intrusion once it has taken 
place and signals an alarm. An IDS also can be deployed to watches for attacks that originate from within a network. A 
shortcoming of current approaches in IDS or IPS is that both only attempt to detect and prevent individual attacks and not 
coordinated distributed attacks [32]. So, that is a lot of research been carried out to centers around improving the ability of 
systems to detect attacks and the speed of the traffic that can be handled for all these security tools. Both signature-based and 
anomaly detection sensors are useful tools, but both only provide a snapshot of the event in time after it has transpired [32]. 
This is to mean that, to know the clues as to what is happening in real-time on a computer network is available but spread out 
all over the network. For instance, current modern operating systems can have logged system and security events at all time. 
Servers keep extensive records of their operations, applications write errors, warnings, and failures to their own logs. Firewalls 
also can program to track how many packets are dropped by different rules typically at the entry and exit points of the network. 
So, if all this information can be brought together to be analyses at almost real time, it would enable more robust attack detection 
mechanisms.  These is later when the SIEM come into the picture for more comprehensive intrusion detections.    
Every SIEM system was designed with the underlying principles to aggregate relevant data from multiple sources, identify 
deviations from the normal pattern and take appropriate action by creating an event to be attend by the security analyst. The 
existence of SIEM systems help to comprehend large amounts of the security data and visualization of all the data is the 
essential part of the SIEM systems.  One of the important of SIEM is the Log Management component that used to normalize, 
classify, prioritize and store collected logs in a storage area.  Another component named as Correlation Engine is to analyze 
events by using all the pre configure rules in the system. And at the end Response system will have to react properly against 
security threats, threat management and action alarm generation. All the analysis was done based on a knowledge base that 
includes attack signatures; attack behavior rules; network security policies and network configuration information. So, SIEM 
is a promising paradigm to reconcile traditional intrusion detection processes along with most recent advances on artificial 
intelligence techniques in providing automatic and self-adaptive systems [29].  
  
SIEM systems already become an important security tools and integral component of today’s information and communication 
network environments. SIEM tools become one of the monitoring tools that can perform early detection for any potential 
attacks that is about to happen [26]. Thus, with the complexity for IT infrastructure and growth of today of network connected 
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world, Monitoring of Security events become one of the important component in most of the organization. SIEM technology 
is able to provide real-time analysis of security alerts generated by systems, applications and by the network hardware 
equipment. SIEM solutions come as a form of software, management services and are used to record data security and to 
generate reports for compliance purposes. The deployment of SIEM tools highly depended on rule-based correlation 
techniques. Since predefined rules can only detect what has been defined beforehand, there is a demand to enhance SIEM 
systems using anomaly detection.  Dealing with the problem of anomaly detection implies the existence of an underlying 
concept of “normality”. Actually, anomaly-based detection usually relies on two levels of abstraction that includes, (i) model 
of normal behavior and (ii) deviation degree measure from normality. Anomaly detection models are built upon some 
algorithms to establish normal behavior standard and identify, as anomaly, any event that deviates from this standard. [1]  
  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the classification of Intrusion Detection. Section 3 
provide literature survey. Section 4 contain the future research areas for anomaly intrusion detections and section 5 concludes 
the paper.  
  
2. CLASSIFICATION OF INTRUSION DETECTION APPROACHES  
  
There are various Intrusion Detection techniques deployed in different security tools such as IDS, IPS and SIEM.  And each of 
the security tools all has different purpose in the network environment for intrusion detections. So, most enterprise will actually 
deploy few security tolls to safe guard their environment than depending on single solution.  For example, IDS is a device or 
software application that monitors a network or systems for malicious activity or policy violations but IPS is a network 
security/threat prevention technology that examines network traffic flows to detect and prevent vulnerability exploits. So, IPS 
IPS is normally refer to as a system with response capabilities. Whereas, SIEM have the features to support for real-time 
aggregation, correlation and analysis of events originating from different end points devices such as IDS, IPS, firewalls, servers 
and anti-virus solutions and generate more relevant alert.  
    
According to [26], a SIEM system combines outputs from multiple sources from the enterprise network, and uses alarm filtering 
techniques to distinguish malicious activity from false alarms. Any detected activities or violations are typically reported by 
alert to the system administrator or collected centrally using a SIEM system to be analyzed by security analyst. For example, 
when SIEM detected a potential issue, it might log additional information, generate an alert and instruct other security controls 
to stop an activity’s progress if the security tools have the feature to re-programmed by scripting. For the most entry level of 
SIEM tool, the SIEM system either be rules-based or employ a statistical correlation engine to establish relationships between 
all the event log entries. One of the most widely deployed methods for detecting cyber terrorist attacks and protecting against 
cyber terrorism employ signature-based detection techniques, this method can only detect previously known attacks that have 
a corresponding signature in the database.  So, the signature database has to be manually revised for each new type of attack 
that is discovered from time to time. These limitations have led to an increasing interest in intrusion detection techniques based 
on data mining [27]. Data mining-based intrusion detection techniques generally fall into one of two categories; misuse 
detection and anomaly detection.   
  
A. Misuse Detection Approaches  
 
For misuse detection in Data Mining-based intrusion detection techniques, each instance or record in a dataset is labelled as  
‘normal’ and a learning algorithm is trained over the labelled data. These techniques are able to automatically retrain intrusion 
detection models on different input data that include new types of attacks, as long as they have been labelled appropriately. 
Research in misuse detection has focused mainly on classification of network intrusions using various standard data mining 
algorithms rare class predictive models, association rules and cost sensitive modelling [11]. Models of misuse are created 
automatically, and can be more sophisticated and precise than manually created signatures. A key advantage of misuse detection 
techniques is their high degree of accuracy in detecting known attacks and their variations. Their obvious drawback is the 
inability to detect attacks whose instances have not yet been observed [11].  
  
B. Anomaly Detection Approaches  
  
Anomaly detection applied to intrusion detection and computer security has been an active area of research since it was 
originally proposed by [2]. There are many models for the anomaly intrusion detection. These models are based on Social and 
Technical type of correlation (ST-SIEM) [15], temporal and logical constraints [16], named as ‘Hierarchical’ correlation 
approach based on a Complex Event Processing (CEP) as well as based on the network attack graph and correlate the events 
through the corresponding attack graph distances. There is also Construction of network attack graphs that is based on the 
application of attacker exploit rules [30]. Anomaly detection approaches build models from all the available normal data and 
detect deviations from the normal model in observed data. The key advantage of Anomaly detection algorithms is they can 
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detect new types of intrusions as deviations from normal usage. In this problem, given a set of normal data to train from, and 
given a new piece of test data, the goal of the intrusion detection algorithm is to determine whether the test data belong to 
“normal” or to an anomalous behavior. However, anomaly detection schemes suffer from a high rate of false alarms. This 
occurs primarily because previously unseen (yet legitimate) system behaviors are also recognized as anomalies, and hence 
flagged as potential intrusions [5].  
  
C. Benchmark Dataset KDD’99 and DARPA98  
  
KDD’99 intrusion detection datasets, which are based on DARPA’98 datasets, provides labelled data for researchers working 
in the field of intrusion detection and is the only labelled dataset publicly available. Numerous researchers employed the 
datasets in KDD’99 intrusion detection datasets to study the utilization of machine learning for intrusion detection and 
reported detection rates up to 91% with false positive rates less than 1% [10].   
  
This paper focuses on a comparative study of anomaly schemes for identifying different network systems intrusion detections.   
Generic Intrusions Detection and Diagnosis Methods that is currently available such as Decision Tree, Neural Networks, Naive 
Bayesian classifiers, Fuzzy sets, Artificial Intelligent and etc.  Focus will be given to research that have used the well-known 
KDD-99 intrusion detection data sets to identify how each component contributes to the overall goals of identifying intrusion 
detections. Since 1999, KDD’99 has been the most widely used data set for the evaluation of anomaly intrusion detection 
methods [21, 22]. The KDD’99 Cup data set was prepared by [23] and was built based on the data captured in DARPA’98 IDS 
evaluation program [24, 25]. This dataset was taken from the Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools 
Competition (KDD Cup 99). The results of these study can lead to any possible future research to identify new intrusion 
detection and diagnosis methods.  
  
The KDD CUP 1999 [20] standard datasets are published for research purpose. It is used in order to assess different feature 
selection method for Intrusion detection system. The dataset consists of 41 features and a separate feature (42nd features) that 
labels the connection as ‘normal’ or type of attack. The data set contains a total of 24 attack types that fall into 4 major categories 
(DoS, U2R, R2L and Probe) as follows:  
  
• Denial of Service Attack (DoS)/attempt to make a network resource unavailable to its intended users such as suspend 
services of a host connected to the Internet.  
• User to Root (U2R) Attack where an attacker attempts to get unauthorized access of target system  
• Remote to User Attack (R2L) where attacker try to control of remote machine by guessing password   
• Probing Attack (Probe) where attacker scene/examine the machine to get useful information KddCup’99  
  
3. LITERATURE SURVEY  
  
Security of network are a major concern for most of the enterprise today, especially with the emerging tendency of 
diversification, sophistication and intelligence on network attack in the connected world today.  the. For all the detections 
techniques available, the principle is as follows: firstly, capturing the data packets that flow through the computer system and 
cleaning the data packets. Secondly, using an appropriate data analysis algorithm to determine whether the data packets is 
normal or abnormal data. Lastly, taking the alarm or other measures to warn or prompt the users for non-normal data. Hence, 
the core of intrusion detection is the algorithm of distinguishing whether the data is normal by analyzing the data packets.   
  
With the emerging and growth of new network attacks, the need for intrusion detection systems to detect novel attacks becomes 
pressing. One of the hardest task accomplish for novel attacks was no knowledge is available for the attacks.  However, a new 
attack will do something that is different from normal activities. So, if the system has comprehensive knowledge about normal 
activities and their normal deviations, then all activities that are not normal can be classified as suspicious activities. Hence, 
the problem can be solved by utilizing the knowledge about unknown attacks from the existing information of normal activities 
as well as known attacks [5]. Many researches has been done to look into intrusion detection techniques with various methods 
and algorithms and named it as anomaly detection or outlier detection. How anomaly detection algorithms work was requiring 
a set of purely normal data to train the anomaly detection model. So, any patterns no observed before from the detection will 
be implicitly assume “anomalies” traffic that need further investigation. So, most researches pointed the outlier that may be 
defined as a data point which is very different from the rest of the data, based on some measure. Most studies employ several 
outlier detection schemes to see how efficient these schemes may deal with the problem of anomaly detection.  
  
In [2], research one of the earliest Intrusion Detection Model name as IDES, this model is a real time system that is capable of 
detecting break-ins, penetrations, and some other forms of computer abuse. IDES is independent of any system, application 
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environment, system vulnerability, or type of intrusion. This IDES model performed on a basis that a security violation can be 
detected by monitoring a system’s audit records for abnormal patterns of system usage. The model includes profiles for 
representing the behavior of subjects with respect to objects in terms of metrics and statistical models, and rules for acquiring 
knowledge about this behavior from audit records and for detecting anomalous behavior. The development of a real-time 
intrusion detection system is motivated by four factors [2]:   
  
a) Most existing systems have security flaws that render them susceptible to intrusions, penetrations, and other forms of 
abuse; finding and fixing all these deficiencies is not feasible for technical and economic reasons;  
b) Existing systems with known flaws are not easily replaced by systems that are more secure -- mainly because the systems 
have attractive features that are missing in the more-secure systems, or else they cannot be replaced for economic 
reasons;  
c) Developing systems that are absolutely secure is extremely difficult, if not generally impossible; and  
d) Even the most secure systems are vulnerable to abuses by insiders who misuse their privileges.  
  
Reference [2] concluded that the IDES model allows intrusions to be detected without knowing about the flaws in the target 
system. Although the approach can detect most intrusions from the experiment, but it may not capable of detecting gradual 
modifications of behavior or through subtle forms of intrusion that use low-level features that produce huge data.   
  
Reference [17], in their paper proposed a socio-technical coordinate system to scale and classify cyber security warnings along 
with security posture levels. Their proposed socio-technical security warning coordinate system was developed to correlate the 
operational environment metrics with an organization's security posture metrics. All the information was then analyzed by the 
system for the actual level of security and identify the potential security gaps and unmanaged risks into one picture for the 
monitor network. The scales used in their scenario are proposed heuristically and further research has been carried to see how 
these levels should be calibrated in [15].   
Figure 1 below was presented in [15] for socio-technical framework for integrating a security risk escalation maturity model 
into a security information and event management system. The objective of this framework is to develop the foundations for 
the next generation socio-technical security information and event management systems (ST-SIEMs) enabling socio-technical 
security operations centers (STSOCs). This STSOCs will be operated with the integration of normal SIEM with the input on 
security risk information.  The primary benefit of the socio-technical framework is to support organizations in overcoming the 
identified limitations in their security risk escalation maturity and also supporting SOCs in overcoming the limitations of their 
SIEMs. Metrics will be used to quantify the risk escalation maturity level. These metrics are then used by SIEMs for cross 
correlating security events before they are disseminated to respective organizations. Generic risk factors were used in today 
typical SIEMs to calculate security events which may not be necessarily relevant for every organization. The proposed 
framework by [15] can enable security administrators to effectively and efficiently manage security warnings and to establish 
necessary countermeasures. Socio-technical correlation engine is one of the common and core component of the ST-SIEM 
system. This engine is designed to perform two types of correlation: social and technical. So, taking the organization security 
risk escalation capabilities into consideration when correlating events logs and disseminating security warnings is one of the 
contribution of the ST-SIEM compared to traditional SIEMs. Whereas, most of today SIEM correlation engine is by design 
focused on the technical attributes of security events which to both FOSS (Free and open source software) and COTS 
(Commercial off-the-shelf) SIEMs.  
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Figure 1: Socio-Technical SIEM Architecture.  
  
  
[16], presented a generic Intrusion Detection and Diagnosis System (ID2S), which implements a comprehensive alert correlation 
workflow for detection and diagnosis of complex intrusion scenarios in Large Scale Complex Critical Infrastructures showed 
in figure 2 below. This ID2S allow detect intrusion scenarios by collecting diverse information at several architectural levels, 
using distributed security probes, as well as perform complex event correlation based on a Complex Event Processing Engine. 
The ID2S used hybrid and hierarchical approach for on-line detection and diagnosis process. During the escalation process, a 
knowledge-based represented by an ontology is used to identified the intrusion symptoms and target and the cause of the 
intrusion. So, in order to recognize complex intrusion patterns and enrich the semantics of diagnosis, a ‘hierarchical’ correlation 
approach based on a Complex Event Processing (CEP) is adopted [16]. The approach captured the causal relationships among 
the resulting alarms by correlating them on the base of temporal and logical constraints. The ID2S architectural model consists 
of a collection of software components that can then transform all the raw attack symptoms into high level intrusion scenario 
alarms/reports to alert the system administrator or/and to perform a recovery action for the system. Every software component 
in the ID2S architectural model will focuses on different aspects of the overall correlation process The correlation capability is 
based on a CEP and driven by knowledge-base, which is used to recognize attack scenarios. Their work shows that it is able to 
detect complex attack scenarios which consist of specific sequence of malicious activities (called  
‘intermediate attacks’) performed by the attacker in order to discover system’s vulnerabilities. However, common weakness of 
this correlation technique is that it requires specific knowledge-based database about the attacks in order to identify their 
prerequisites and consequences. The hybrid and hierarchical approach is difficult to define all prerequisites and all of the 
possible consequences. Therefore, the major limitation of this ID2S technique was it cannot correlate unknown attacks since 
their prerequisites and consequences are not defined.  
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Figure 2: The proposed ID2S framework  
  
Reference [18] proposed an Advanced SIEM that intended to be implemented in the framework of the EU MASSIF project.  
The EU MASSIF project used the NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [28] that based on Common Vulnerabilities 
and Exposures (CVE) dictionary to construct the basis of attack graph via known vulnerabilities. This Advanced SIEM have 
one main analytical components which name as Attack Modelling and Security Evaluation Component (AMSEC) was outlines. 
The AMSEC based on modeming of malefactors’ behavior, building a common attack graph, processing current alerts for real-
time adjusting of particular attack graphs, calculating different security metrics and providing security assessment procedures. 
The AMSEC prototype is intended to complement the SIEM analysis functionality with the capability of attack modelling and 
security evaluation and it was successfully calculated the security metrics for the evaluate systems.   
  
  
Figure 3: General architecture of Attack Modelling and Security Evaluation Component (AMSEC)  
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Reference [3], Mahoney. MV and Chan P.K. proposed a learning algorithms based model of normal behavior from attack free 
network. In the event of any behavior that deviates from the learned normal model from the normal traffic signals possible 
novel attacks. That is 2 unique aspects in their proposed learning algorithms. First, it is non-stationary, modelling probabilities 
based on the time since the last event rather than on average rate, which can prevent alarm floods. Second, the algorithms learn 
protocol vocabularies (at the data link through application layers) in order to detect unknown attacks that attempt to exploit 
implementation errors in poorly tested features of the target software. The non-stationary features have two non-stationary 
components developed and tested on the 1999 DARPA IDS evaluation test set, which simulates through a local network under 
attack. The first component is a packet header anomaly detector (PHAD) which monitors the entire data link, network, and 
transport layer, without any preconceptions about which fields might be useful. The second component is an application layer 
anomaly detector (ALAD) which combines a traditional user model based on TCP connections with a model of text-based 
protocols such as HTTP, FTP, and SMTP. Both systems learn which attributes are useful for anomaly detection, and then use 
a non-stationary model, in which events receive higher scores if no novel values have been seen for a long time. They evaluate 
its performance on the DARPA IDS evaluation data set and investigate the contribution of user vs. software anomalies toward 
detection. Their result classified anomalies into five categories based on the learn model and data set:  
  
a) Learned signatures -this learned signature attempts to exploit bugs in the target system. They will first find a security 
vulnerability is an error, whether in software design, coding, or system configuration. And follow by attackers exploit 
these errors. That is impossible to test software completely, some errors will always be discovered in software after it 
has been delivered and put to use. So, errors that are least likely to be discovered and patched are those that occur least 
often in normal traffic. Any traffic or action that invoke those uncovered error is likely to be unusual. This is what their 
researcher name it learned signature anomaly. [3]   
b) Induced anomalies – When that is symptoms of a successful attack, we can observe anomalous behavior from the target 
after a successful attack even sometimes the anomalous input is missed. This anomalies technique is similar to Forrest's 
host based anomaly detection technique, except that the symptoms are observed in the output of the target, rather than 
in the system calls that it makes.   
c) Evasion anomalies – When they discovered when that is attempts to elude the IDS. Which mean the attacker tries to 
exploit errors in the IDS to hide the attack, for example, FIN scanning by port sweep to prevent server accesses from 
being logged. If the attempt backfires, as it does in this case, they call it an evasion anomaly.   
d) Attacker errors – When that is bugs in the attacking program or software. The attacker might introduce arbitrary 
variations in the data, which they considered to be errors in the attacking software. Most provide no clues as to the 
nature of the attack.  
e) User behavior – Which unexpected client IP addresses were discovered. Finally, behavioral anomaly detection models 
users rather than software. Most of the U2R attacks are discovered because the exploit software is uploaded on an FTP 
server normally used for downloads. Many R2L attacks are discovered because the client IP address is not one of the 
usual users.  
  
Reference [5], proposed a method based on a technique called pseudo-Bayes estimators to enhance an anomaly detection 
system’s ability to detect new attacks while reducing the false alarm rate as much as possible.  The anomaly detection system 
called Audit Data Analysis and Mining (ADAM) that was developed at the Center for Secure Information Systems of George 
Mason University was one of their reference model. ADAM (Audit Data and Mining) is a combination anomaly detector and 
classifier trained on both attack-free traffic and traffic with labelled attacks. It was also designed to have separate training 
modes and detection modes. ADAM applies mining association rules techniques to look for the abnormal events in network 
traffic data, then it uses a classification algorithm to classify the abnormal events into normal instances and abnormal instances. 
The abnormal instances can be further categorized into attack names if ADAM has gained knowledge about the attacks. With 
the help of the classifier, the number of false alarms is greatly reduced because the abnormal associations that belong to normal 
instances will be filtered out. However, the normal instances and attacks that the classifier can recognize are limited to those 
that appear in the training data. The design composed of three modules: a pre-processing engine, a mining engine and a 
classification engine. The pre-processing engine sniffs TCP/IP traffic data, and extracts information from the header of each 
connection according to a predefined schema. The mining engine applies mining association rules to the connection records. It 
works on two modes: training mode and detecting mode. In training mode, the mining engine builds a profile of the users and 
systems normal behaviors, and generates labelled association rules, which will be used to train the classification engine. In 
detecting mode, the mining engine mines unexpected association rules that are different from the profile. The classification 
engine will classify the unexpected association rules into normal and abnormal events. Some abnormal events can be further 
classified as attack names. Although mining of association rules has previously been used to detect intrusions in audit trail data. 
ADAM is unique in two ways:  
  
• It is real-time: it uses an incremental mining (on-line mining) which does not look at a batch of TCP/IP connections, 
but rather employs a sliding window of time to find the suspicious rules within that window.  
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• It is an anomaly detection system (instead of a misuse detection system like previous systems that use data mining for 
intrusion detection. Since it aims to detect anomalous behavior relative to a profile. For this, the technique builds, a profile 
of “normal” rules, obtained by mining past periods of time in which there were no attacks. Any rule discovered during the 
on-line mining that also belongs to this profile is ignored, assuming it corresponds to a normal behavior. In this sense, our 
technique looks for unexpected rules. This helps in reducing the number of false positives flagged by the technique.  
  
[5] shown that the pseudo-Bayes estimator method can enhance ADAM’s ability to detect new attacks. The experimental results 
show that the method helps in detecting new attacks whose properties are different and distinguishable from the normal 
instances of training data. For new attacks that do not differ much from the normal instances, the method does not work well 
and will misclassify them as normal instances (misclassification is not unique in pseudo-Bayes, and it exists in every supervised 
classifier when some classes are not distinguishable). However, the ability to capture new classes is rarely present in classifiers, 
and that is what they have achieved in their work.  
  
Reference [4] developed at SRI in the EMERALD system that used historical records as its normal training data. It compares 
distributions of new data to the distributions obtained from those historical records and differences between the distributions 
indicate an intrusion. Next generation Intrusion Detection Expert System (NIDES) [4], like ADAM, monitors ports and 
addresses. Instead of using explicit training data, it builds a model of long term behavior over a period of hours or days, which 
is assumed to contain few or no attacks. If short term behavior (seconds, or a single packets) differs significantly, then an alarm 
is raised. NIDES does not model known attacks; instead it is used as a component of EMERALD [11], which includes host and 
network based signature detection for known attacks. The statistical approach used in NIDES is to compare a subject’s short-
term behavior with the subject’s historical or long-term behavior. In the traditional NIDES framework, a subject is a user of a 
computer system. In the Safeguard context, a subject is an application. In comparing short-term behavior with long-term 
behavior, the statistical component is concerned both with long term behaviors that do not appear in short-term behavior, and 
with short-term behaviors that are not typical of long-term behavior. Whenever short-term behavior is sufficiently unlike long-
term behavior, a warning flag is raised. They performed five experiments; three experiments - concept, verification, and 
refinement - were run to determine the most suitable configurations for the Safeguard application of NIDES. Each of these first 
three experiments include the following steps:  
  
i They set up a predetermined set of configurations for the experiment. Each experiment they ran had a different 
configuration.  
ii They ran TIS-supplied audit data through the statistical analysis component of NIDES to develop baseline profiles of 
applications.  
iii. They performed false-positive tests on the profiles developed to determine if the profile was stable enough to be used in 
subsequent tests.  
iv. They ran tests using data that included masquerading applications to perform true positive testing.  
v. They reviewed the results of the experiment to determine the appropriate configuration for subsequent experiments. Their 
goal was to improve NIDES performance as their experiments progressed.  
  
In the fourth experiment, they ran a cross-profiling experiment to perform additional true-positive testing, using the 
configuration setting of their refinement experiment. Finally, they performed experiments with application groups using 
information gathered during the cross-profiling experiment. Overall their results from the first (concept) experiment to their 
third (refinement) experiment give an improvement. They had higher detection rates and generally lower false-positive rates. 
The cross-profiling experiment gave them additional insight into similarities of the applications in their test set and how easily 
one application in the test set could masquerade as another application in the test set. They also gained some understanding of 
the results one obtains when profiling application groups instead of individual applications - in general, the ability to detect 
anomalous activity (detection sensitivity) seemed to decrease when they worked with application groupings.  
  
Reference [9] performed anomaly detection on unlabeled data by looking at user profiles and comparing the activity during an 
intrusion to the non-activity during normal use. They have developed an approach to these problems that examines sequences 
of user actions (UNIX commands) to classify behavior as normal or anomalous. In the paper they explore the matching function 
needed to compare a current behavioral sequence to a historical profile. They discussed the difficulties of performing matching 
in human-generated data and show that exact string matching is insufficient to a single domain. They demonstrated several 
partial matching functions and examine their behavior on user command data. In particular, they explored two methods for 
weighting scores by adjacency of matches as well as two growth functions (polynomial and exponential) for scoring similarities. 
They found that, the best measure is user-dependent and there are indications that it may also depend on choice of instance 
selection technique and even the identity of the anomalous/intrusive user. There do, however, seem to be indications that 
polynomials bounded measures and measures biased in support of adjacent matches are, overall, preferable. Both the adjacency 
and the polynomial bound are evidence in support of the hypothesis that user behavioral sequences are characterized by strong 
correlations among temporally close command tokens.  
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Reference [12] classified the KDD99 dataset into four categories and all dataset split into training and testing set of data. 
According to [12], tree based data mining classification techniques such as Hoeffding tree, j48, Random Forest, Random Tree,  
RepTree were use in his study on intrusion detection dataset KDD Cup1999 using EKA 3.9 tool. In general result show using 
10 fold cross validation Random forest best for Train set and J48 best for test dataset considering their comparative 
classification accuracy. The big challenge in intrusion detection is to achieve high detection rate and low false alarm. Any 
single classifier is not sufficient to achieve high accuracy and low false positive or negative. Therefore, more than one classifier 
can be combined to improve overall performance of attack detection  
  
Reference [13] developed a new approach for network anomaly detection by combining neural network and clustering 
algorithms. They propose modified Self Organizing Map (SOM) algorithms which initially starts with null network and grows 
with the original data space as initial weight vector, updating neighborhood rules and learning rate dynamically in order to 
overcome the fixed architecture and random weight vector assignment of simple SOM. New nodes are created using distance 
threshold parameter and their neighborhood is identified using connection strength and its learning rule and the weight vector 
updating is carried out for neighborhood nodes.  The k-means clustering algorithm is employed for grouping similar nodes of 
Modified SOM into k clusters using similarity measures. Performance of the new approach is evaluated with standard KDD 
cup99 bench mark dataset. The new approach is evaluated using performance metrics such as detection rate and false alarm 
rate. The modified SOM is used to create the network with the help of distances threshold, connection strength and 
neighborhood functions and k-means clustering algorithms groups the nodes in the network with the help of similarity 
measures. The modified self-organizing map has improved 2% higher detection rate compared to the existing SOM but when 
k-means is deployed it is further increased by 1.5%. It starts with null network and gradually evolves with original data space. 
The updating of neighborhood function has been improved with the help of connection strength. The learning rate is found to 
plays the vital role by spreading the map as observed when the learning rate increases the number of output nodes decreases. 
In particular, the proposed work is found to effective for detecting DOS attacks with 98.5% detection rate.   
  
Reference [14] proposed a flow-based anomaly detection system. Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is an important approach 
for anomaly detection in their study. They used a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) neural network with one hidden layer and 
investigate the use of a Gravitational Search Algorithm (GSA) in optimizing interconnection weights of a MLP network. Their 
proposed GSA-based flow anomaly detection system (GFADS) is trained with a flow-based data set. The trained system can 
classify benign and malicious flows with 99.43% accuracy and they compare the performance of GSA with traditional gradient 
descent training algorithms and a particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm. The results show that GFADS is effective in 
flow-based anomaly detection. This study has been done based on centralized processing.  
  
In [32], they developed an alert clustering and classification system which is able to classify IDS alerts and reduces false 
positive alerts using clustering of genetic algorithms. Alert filtering algorithm were used in their system to improve the accuracy 
and reduce false positive alerts. Their experiment was performed on dataset of DARPA KDD Cup 98 with two new clustering 
algorithms. Result were than compared other genetic algorithms and their GA algorithm cluster and classify the alerts with 
high accuracy and able to reduce the number of false positive alerts considerably.   
  
  
A. Summary of Literature  
 
IPS, IDS and SIEM even were not closely linked, but the three technologies are usually the security tools will be used by 
majority of the enterprise in order to know and see what is going on in the network. All these technologies passed an approval 
stage in R&D and become marketable product to fulfil the demand for the emerging need of security tools. However, the 
changes and improvement in threats also lead to the demand for evolvement of the security solution.  So, now we have IPS 
technology build into firewall technology as the first line of defense to determine and protect against attacks, however that is 
no obsolete equipment can provide overall protection for an organization. IPS came from the development of another layer to 
protect firewalls and desktop anti-virus. A common flaw with signature-based and heuristic engines is that they have 
milliseconds to make a decision, so attacks are only detected on static code. Today complex enterprise need to see an overall 
evolution of product layers. it was important to have a holistic view, and a good SIEM that ‘can bring things together' and allow 
you to manage third party software is crucial. SIEM provide the central visibility with log management that can give multiple 
use cases across security and performance management in an organization.   
SIEM, IPS and IDS are still relevant even not closely linked as they can protect against modern attacks. They evolve as the 
attacks evolve, which adds credibility to the argument that a second layer is needed to protect networks. With regard to IPS 
solutions, it is firmly believed that it still serves the purpose. Both IDS and IPS are able to intelligently add value into a SIEM 
solution by analyzing the network traffic and alerting on detected patterns of attack. Technologies such as SIEM, IPS and IDS 
   
 
70 | 
 
National Conference for Postgraduate Research 
(NCON-PGR) 
are all key to securing their own part of the enterprise These technologies is still required to detect or prevent most attacks, but 
they must be integrated to provide a coherent and contextual view, not lots of large volume of standalone bits and pieces without 
centralize view of the overall detections in the enterprise.  
A SIEM on its own is useless because it has no ability to monitor the raw security events as they happen throughout the 
enterprise. SIEMs are designed to use log data as recorded by other pieces of software. There is limitation in term of anomalies 
detection by a correlation engine in IPS or IDS. This is where new technology comes into play. Correlation can detect incidents 
that poses threat to your enterprise, whereas anomaly detection can detect incidents that belong to zero days’ categories. This 
capability is a breakthrough to the issues previously found in traditional IPS/SIEM/log management solutions. By providing a 
self-learning technology that uses the taxonomy of the incoming events to build a baseline, modern SIEM solutions can 
automatically detect deviations from the baseline in order to make alert users for any new, unknown threats.  In order to remain 
competitive, the SIEM providers must deliver these advanced capabilities alongside ease-of-use, which will definitely create a 
change within the SIEM market. Table 1 below are the summarized general functionality provided by of IDS, IPS which 
indicate the SIEM does have some advantage over the other solution.   
 
Table 1: General functionality of IDS, IPS and SIEM  
IDS  IPS  SIEM  
Detection mode only  Active traffic control  Big volume of log collection – Forensics & 
Retention  
Traffic replication 
required  
“Original traffic required”  IT Compliance  
Decoupling  detection 
 and  
reaction functionalities  
Detection and reaction 
support  
enable centralized analysis and reporting for an 
organization's security events  
IDS as a good assistant for 
network administration  
No administrator 
assistance needed   
Event Correlation -Improve the efficiency of 
incident handling activities.  
Usually used for testing 
rules  
Require strict 
configuration  
User Activity Monitoring  
 
  
4. FUTURE RESEARCH IN INTRUSION DETECTION FOR NGSOC  
  
Based on the previous summary from the literature survey. It is obvious that SIEM can give a wider view of the network 
environment within an enterprise. SIEM is a solution that provides a comprehensive view of security posture of an IT 
infrastructure and it is the core component for all the Security Operation Center (SOC) to correlate events and send alerts to 
the system owners to take action if found any intrusion. Two key objectives of SIEM is to detect security incidents in near real 
time and managing logs. SIEM collects information such as logs, events and network flows from various devices on a network, 
correlates and analyzes the data to detect incidents and abnormal patterns of activity. When successfully deployed and 
configured, a SIEM helps organizations:  
  
• Discover internal/external threats.  
• Monitor (privileged) user activity and access to resources.  
• Provide compliance reporting.  
• Support incident response.  
  
SIEM system use various conditions to check whether certain events are matching a rule, and depending on the threat, an alarm 
can be triggered. Typically, there 3 main categories of conditions:  
  
a) Event Based: Y assets log an event targeted at host Y and vulnerability scanner knows that Y is vulnerable. It triggers 
an alert.  
b) Rule Based: If Log X + Log Y + Log Z then create event F, plus if F repeats more than 5 times in 60 seconds. It triggers 
an alert.   
c) Anomaly Based: If the event F exceeds the standard deviation of historic traffic patterns then trigger an alert in cases 
like malware and DDos.  
  
Once alert is triggered, the team will investigate the alert, escalate the incident to the respective team for remediation. The task 
to create rules are commonly executing by threat analyst who on continuous basis hunting for indicator of compromise by 
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analyzing threat intelligence feed. One approach to causal event correlation is to apply logical rules that chain together events 
based on their relevant attributes. But there are several problems with rule-based approaches to event correlation. It can be 
difficult for complex rule systems to keep pace with online streams of events and maintaining the rule sets needed for 
constructing attack scenarios from disparate events can be difficult. Also, missing events can prevent rules from assembling a 
proper attack scenario and attempts at inferring hypothetical missing attacks can lead to irrelevant results [10].  
  
a) Current algorithms and methods in the correlator produces higher false positive events.    
b) Current algorithms and methods in the correlator need longer time when doing the event correlation analysis.  
c) Current available algorithms and methods in the correlation methodologies are hard to detect abnormal event pattern in 
isolation.  
  
To further improve anomaly detection mechanism while reducing the false alarm rate in SIEM, further research shall be carried 
out to develop new incident detection method that can improve the accuracy and reduce false alarm rate when compare to 
earlier research.   
  
5. CONCLUSION  
  
This paper studied the prior researches that been carried out to improve the incident detection in the IDS, IPS and SIEM. 
Various work been carried out for numerous types of incidents detection methods in IDS, IPS and SIEM. However, there are 
little work been done for integrating some well-established incident detection method that can be apply for SIEM. So, this 
paper will provide fundamental input for type of algorithms and model to be further developed and implement with the SIEM 
tools available in the market. This new method will be developed as a middleware to integrate with SIEM to complete the 
NGSOC (Next Generation Security Operation Centre) concept.   
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